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1
States,2 and adopted by Wisconsin in State v. Richards..
Since the court did not state a general rule as to when this rule
applies outside of criminal cases, it is impossible to predict how
widely it might be applied. The court went on to hold, however,
that the officer had the burden of proving that he was prejudiced by the failure to produce the statements in order to establish a denial of due process and that no prejudice was shown
on the record.

MARY

F.

WYANT

PROPERTY
I.

LANDLORD - TENANT

The legal rights of tenants were expanded this term in
College Mobile Home Park and Sales, Inc. v. Hoffman,' in
which the court held that exculpatory clauses in leases may
under some circumstances be invalid. The court refused to set
any absolute rule stating that certain categories of exculpatory
clauses are void, preferring to develop the rule by case-by-case
application.
College Mobile Home began as an eviction action commenced by the landlord for nonpayment of rent. The tenant
counterclaimed for personal injury and other damage allegedly
caused by the landlord's failure to maintain adequate heating.
The landlord moved for summary judgment on the counterclaim based on an exculpatory agreement in the lease releasing
the landlord from liability for property damage and personal
injury. The trial court dismissed the motion on the grounds
that the clause should not be enforced and the supreme court
affirmed.
The court first stated that although exculpatory clauses are
generally valid on the principle of freedom of contract, they are
usually strictly construed in favor of the tenant. It then noted
that several states have either legislatively prohibited such
clauses or judicially held them unenforceable as against public
29. 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
30. 21 Wis. 2d 622, 124 N.W.2d 684 (1963).
1. 72 Wis. 2d 514, 241 N.W.2d 174 (1976).
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policy.2 Concluding that on public policy grounds exculpatory
clauses may be invalid, the court nonetheless said that the best
approach would be a rule supporting the general principle of
freedom of contract but recognizing that this may cause unfair
results in some circumstances:
The unconsidered application of the principle of freedom of
contract, even when accomplished by the rules of strict construction, is not always justified when there are extenuating
circumstances which may affect the degree to which that
freedom actually exists. Therefore, we are of the opinion that
the better view is that which takes into account the actual
effect of the particular clauses in question and that [sic] the
facts and circumstances attendant
upon the creation of the
3
landlord-tenant relationship.
By requiring the trial court to consider the facts and circumstances attendant to the exculpatory clause in determining
its enforceability, the court concluded that the trial court had
properly denied the landlord's motion for summary judgment
to the tenant's counterclaim. The court then held that in
College Mobile Home it was a question of fact whether the
circumstances were such that the clause should not be enforced
and so affirmed the trial court's denial of the landlord's motion
for summary judgment.
I.

EMINENT DoMAIN

A. Claim Procedure
In 1970, the court in Luber v. Milwaukee County4 ruled that
owners of a condemned rental property were entitled, under the
"just compensation" provision of the Wisconsin Constitution,5
to compensation for the entire rental loss caused by a taking
of property under eminent domain, despite a statutory provision limiting lost rent recovery to twelve months.6 The case
2. See N.Y. GEN. OBLG. LAW § 5-321 (McKinney 1964); MASS. LAWS ANN. 186-15
(Supp. 1975); McCutchenon v. United Homes Corp., 79 Wash. 2d 443, 486 P.2d 1093
(1971); Tenants Council v. DeFranceaux, 305 F. Supp. 560 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Kuzmiak
v. Brookchester, Inc., 33 N.J. Super. 575, 111 A.2d 425 (1955); Cardova v. Eden Realty,
118 N.J. Super. 381, 288 A.2d 34 (1972); Crowell v. Housing Auth., 495 S.W.2d 887
(Tex. 1973).
3. 72 Wis. 2d at 517, 241 N.W.2d at 177.
4. 47 Wis. 2d 271, 177 N.W.2d 380 (1970).
5. WiS. CONST. art. I, § 13: "The property of no person shall be taken for public
use without just compensation therefor."
6. Wis. STAT. § 32.19 (1967).
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caused speculation that a wide variety of incidental damages
might now be compensable, 7 although subsequent amendments to Wisconsin Statutes section 32.19, which sets out in
considerable detail precisely which damages are compensable
in addition to the value of the condemned property itself, seem
to indicate a legislative intent to restrict compensable damages
8
within the constitutional boundaries of Luber.
The court in Rotter v. Milwaukee County Expressway and
Transportation Commission9 indicated this term that the
Luber holding will be confined quite strictly to its facts. The
plaintiffs in Rotter brought an action for various items of incidental damage caused by the defendant commission's condemnation proceeding. They did not follow the statutory scheme of
presenting the claims first to the condemnor for voluntary payment"0 because the items claimed were not among the enumerated items of compensable damage under the then-existing version of section 32.19." Rather, they demanded compensation
for these items for the first time in a trial to the circuit court.
The commission argued that the plaintiffs had forfeited any
right to assert their claim for these items by failing to file them
with the commission. The plaintiffs countered that they had
not followed the statutory procedure because the items were
clearly not compensable under section 32.19. They argued that
Luber had created an extra-statutory category of compensable
damages and that the proper procedure for recovery of such
damages was to commence an action in the circuit court, bypassing the statutory claim procedure.
The supreme court rejected the plaintiffs' argument on the
grounds that the only effect of Luber was to invalidate the time
limits set by section 32.19, not to create a new cause of action:
The Luber holding is to be read and limited to its holding
that the twelve-month limit as to rent losses was constitutionally invalid. It is true, as Luber noted, that when property
is taken by condemnation "incidental damages are very apt
to occur." That is not to say that a cause of action for com7. See Note, Eminent Domain - Compensationfor Lost Rents, 1971 Wis. L. REV.
657.
8. 1971 Wis. Laws, chs. 99, 103, 244, 287; 1973 Wis. Laws, ch. 192; 1975 Wis. Laws,
chs. 224, 273.
9. 72 Wis. 2d 553, 241 N.W.2d 440 (1976).
10. Wis. STAT. § 32.20 (1965).
11. Wis.STAT. § 32.19 (1965).
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pensation for incidental damages has been created that has
no basis or relatedness to the items made compensable by
sec. 32.19, Stats. It means only that payment and time limits
set forth in sec. 32.19 may encounter constitutional difficul2
ties, as did the twelve-month rent loss limit in Luber.'
The court went on to state that in the situation presented
in Rotter, a property owner claiming items not enumerated in
the statute must first present his claim to the condemnor, as
outlined in the statute, and may take his claim to the court
only after rejection by the condemnor. The broader significance
of Rotter, however, is its strict limitation of Luber to a means
for challenging statutory limitations on compensable damage.
It seems clear from Rotter that Luber did not open the door to
a potentially wide variety of compensable incidental damages.
B. Compensationfor Inconvenience
The court in DeBruin v. Green County 3 determined that
under section 32.09(6)'" the owner of property partially taken
in a condemnation proceeding is not entitled to compensation
for inconvenience caused by public improvement work done on
the condemned property. Some confusion had existed on this
point because an earlier case, Carazalla v. State,'5 had held
under a predecessor statute that inconvenience was not compensable as a separate item, but that it would be taken into
consideration in determining the value of the property after the
taking. This rule became incorporated in the standard jury
instruction."1
Green County took a strip of the plaintiffs' property as a
part of a highway widening project. After the property was
taken and work had been started, the plaintiffs' normal access
to their remaining property became impassable and they had
to devise an alternate and inconvenient accessway. They
commenced an action in circuit court to determine the amount
of just compensation for the condemned property, believing
that the amount offered by the county was inadequate. 7 The
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

72 Wis. 2d at 562-63, 241 N.W.2d at 445.
72 Wis. 2d 464, 241 N.W.2d 167 (1976).
Wis. STAT. § 32.09(6) (1973).
269 Wis. 593, 70 N.W.2d 208 (1955).
WIs. J. I. - CIVIL No. 8125.
Wis. STAT. § 32.05(11) (1973) provides for a trial on the amount of compensa-
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trial court granted the county's motion to bar any evidence on
the inconvenience suffered by the plaintiffs due to the loss of
access. The supreme court affirmed.
Under section 32.09(6), the proper amount of compensation
in the case of a partial taking is the difference between the fair
market value of the entire property immediately before the
evaluation date and its fair market value immediately after the
evaluation "assuming completion of the public improvement."' The court found that compensation for the inconvenience caused by construction of the highway improvement
would not meet this formula, since it does not make the required assumption of completion of the improvement.
The court also found that the measure of compensation
allowed under section 32.09(6) conforms to the Wisconsin Constitution just compensation requirement.' 9 It pointed out that
the highway construction work took place entirely after the
taking of the property and thus was an exercise of the police
power, not the power of eminent domain, and thus was noncompensable. 0 An exercise of police power creates a compensable taking only if the impairment of the use of the remaining
property is so great as to be considered an actual taking of that
2
portion of the property, which was not the case in DeBruin. '
C. Evidence
Under section 32.09(1),22 compensation for condemned
property is determined as of the "date of evaluation. 2 3 In
Schey Enterprises, Inc. v. State,24 decided in 1971, the court
ruled that testimony as to an appraisal of condemned property
18. Wis. STAT. § 32.09(6) (1973) states in pertinent part:
In the case of a partial taking, the compensation to be paid by the condemnor
shall be determined by deducting from the fair market value of the wholz property immediately before the date of evaluation, the fair market value of the
remainder immediately after the date of evaluation, assuming the completion
of the public improvement and giving effect, without allowance of offset for
general benefits, and without restriction because of enumeration but without
duplication, to the following items of loss or damage to the property where
shown to exist . ...
19. WiS. CONST. art. I, § 13.
20. 72 Wis. 2d at 472, 241 N.W.2d at 170-71.
21. Id. at 470-71, 241 N.W.2d at 169-70.
22. Wis. STAT. § 32.09(1) (1973).
23. The date of evaluation is determined by § 32.05(7) (c) or § 32.06(7), depending
on the purpose for which the property is taken. The dates of evaluation set by these
statutes relate to various stages of the condemnation proceedings.
24. 52 Wis. 2d 361, 190 N.W.2d 149 (1971).
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made nine months before the evaluation date was not admissible to prove the value of the property on the evaluation date.
This rule was modified this term in Rollie Johnson Plumbing
v. Department of Transportation.2 The court in Johnson held
that evidence as to an appraisal made seventeen months before
the evalution date was admissible where the appraiser was able
to testify that the property had appreciated since the appraisal,
and there was other evidence of the value of the property at the
evaluation date. In Schey, the appraisal made nine months
before the evaluation date was the only evidence offered.
The court had hinted in Schey that evidence relative to the
value of property at a date prior to the evaluation date is not
necessarily inadmissible, so long as it can be related forward
to the date of evaluation." Johnson apparently is an example
of the kind of evidence sufficient to relate appraisal evidence
forward. The essential distinction, the court said, was that in
Johnson the combination of the early appraisal value, the appraiser's opinion that the property had appreciated, and the
other evidence as to the value of the property on the date of
evaluation provided the jury with a range within which it could
determine the value. Such a range was missing in Schey, where
the evidence showed only a single value at a time well in advance of the evaluation date.
HL1.

MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE PROCEDURE

In First Wisconsin National Bank v. KSW Investments,
Inc.,27 the court clarified language used earlier in Citizens Bank
v. Rose 8 to interpret section 816.165(2).2 Section 816.165 defines the procedure in a judicial mortgage foreclosure sale;
subsection (2) gives the rule for confirmation of sale when the
sale price is less than the amount due on the mortgage:
In case the mortgaged premises sell for less than the amount
due and to become due on the mortgage debt and costs of
sale, there shall be no presumption that such premises sold
for their fair value and no sale shall be confirmed and judgment for deficiency rendered, until the court is satisfied that
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

70 Wis. 2d 787, 235 N.W.2d 528 (1975).
52 Wis. 2d at 369, 190 N.W.2d at 154.
71 Wis. 2d 359, 238 N.W.2d 123 (1976).
59 Wis. 2d 385, 208 N.W.2d 110 (1973).
Wis. STAT. § 816.165(2) (1973).
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the fair value of the premises sold has been credited on the
mortgage debt, interest and costs.
In Citizens Bank the court had indicated that a trial court
applying section 816.165(2) need not find the fair value of the
foreclosed property in all cases: "The upset price or the fair
value finding is utilized in the discretion of the court only after
the court finds the price bid to be so inadequate as to shock its
conscience." 3 The Citizens Bank court, therefore, had patently
heightened the restriction placed on foreclosure sales by making judicial supervision discretionary.
The court in First Wisconsin corrected this statement, holding that under its express language, section 816.165(2) requires
the trial court to make a finding that the fair value of the
property has been credited toward the debt in every case in
which the amount realized on sale is less than the amount
owed:
The language of the statute mandates that no sale shall be
confirmed until the court is satisfied that the fair value of the
premises has been credited toward the mortgage debt, interest and costs. For ease of administration and consistent with
logical interpretation of the statute, the trial court should,
when confronted with a motion to confirm a sheriff's sale
where the mortgaged premises have been sold for less than
the amount due on the mortgage, make a specific finding of
the fair value of the premises and make a specific finding that
such value has been credited to the mortgage debt. These
findings should be made even though the trial court's consci3
ence is not shocked by the bid'.
When the bid price is sufficiently below the fair market value
of the property, as ascertained by the court, to shock the conscience of the court, it may then exercise its broad discretion
32
to deny continuation of the sale.
IV.

CONDOMINIUM LAW

Condominium owners won a measure of protection against
liability occasioned by a developer's poor business judgment in
Stevens Construction Corp. v. DraperHall, Inc.3 3 The decision
30.
31.
32.
33.

59 Wis. 2d at 388, 208 N.W.2d at 112.
71 Wis. 2d at 369, 238 N.W.2d at 128.
Id. at 363, 238 N.W.2d at 125.
73 Wis. 2d 104, 242 N.W.2d 893 (1976).
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will doubtlessly make condominium ownership more attractive
to the cautious purchaser.
The plaintiffs in Stevens had provided general construction
and landscaping work on a condominium developed by defendant Draper Hall. Construction began before the developer
filed its condominium declaration with the register of deeds
pursuant to section 703.03.34 After the declaration had been
filed and several of the units had been sold to individual owners, each of the plaintiffs filed a construction lien against the
property in accordance with section 289.06.35 The plaintiffs
later commenced proceedings to foreclose their liens, naming
as defendants both the developer, who retained ownership of
the unsold units, and the individual unit owners.
The issue was whether each unit owner was liable for the
full amount of the lien or only for a share proportionate to the
extent of his ownership. This turned on a construction of section 703.09(2), which states in pertinent part:
If a lien becomes effective against 2 or more units, any unit
owner may remove the lien from his unit and from the percentage of undivided interest in the common areas and facilities
appurtenant to such unit by payment of the fractional or
proportionate amount attributable to his unit, such amount
to be computed by reference to the percentages appearing on
the declaration."
Both the trial court and the supreme court ruled that each
unit owner was liable for only a proportionate share of the lien,
but on different theories. The trial court reasoned that the liens
did not become "effective" within the meaning of section
703.09(2) until the time of the filing of the liens, rather than
the time that construction began. Since the liens were filed
after the condominium declaration was filed and several of the
units had been sold, the lien had become "effective against 2
or more units," so that the statutory limitation protected individual owners from full liability. The plaintiffs' argument was
that the liens became effective at the time construction began,
before the condominium declaration was filed, resulting in a
blanket lien on the whole property.
The supreme court held that the lien became effective as of
34. Wis.
35. Wis.
36. Wis.

STAT.
STAT.
STAT.

§ 703.03 (1973).
§ 289.06 (1973).
§ 703.09(2) (1973).
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commencement of construction, making it originally effective
as a blanket lien against the whole property, but that upon
filing of the condominium declaration it became effective
against the individual units within the meaning of the statute,
with the result that each unit owner was liable only for a proportionate share.
The critical time, the court ruled, is the date of commencement of foreclosure proceedings and the filing of a lis pendens
against the property. So long as the condominium declaration
is filed before foreclosure proceedings are commenced, section
703.09 applies and each owner is liable only for his proportionate share. However, if the foreclosure is started before the declaration is filed, "the situation is frozen so that the subsequent
recording of a declaration does not transform the blanket lien
into a proportional lien on individual units. ' 37
The court explained its ruling by saying that foreclosure is
an equitable proceeding and it is patently inequitable to charge
individual unit owners with liability for the full value of a lien
against the entire property.
MARY F. WYANT

TAXATION AND TRUSTS AND ESTATES

I.

ACCRUED LIABILITIES

In Wisconsin, corporations are allowed to deduct from their
gross income compensation paid to employees for services rendered.' Frequently, in addition to the employees' regular
wages, companies will also pay bonuses and vacation pay, or
both. When these payments have been made in good faith, and
as additional compensation, they are likewise deductible.'
Ladish Co. v. Department of Revenue3 involved a situation
where an accrual basis calendar year corporation was denied a
37. 73 Wis. 2d at 115, 242 N.W.2d at 898.

§ 71.04(1)(1973).
2. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-9 (1958); McCoy-Brandt Mach. Co., 8 B.T.A. 909 (1927)
(acq.); I.R.C. § 463.
3. 69 Wis. 2d 723, 233 N.W.2d 354 (1975).
1. Wis. STAT.

